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Educating for a Life of Virtue and Purpose: Starting Points
Terrance D. Olson
Sept 19, 2014
Conference on Civic Virtue, Civic Life

Regarding contemporary public educational endeavors to foster moral virtue, my
task is to ask two questions: “What now?” and “How is it done?” Including education for
moral virtue in a curriculum is basic to nurturing the three “Cs”: character, civility and
citizenship. Without these ethical anchors, the fruits of being in a democracy are less
likely to be realized. Corruption undermines the rule of law, community cohesion and
quality relationships. When the moral fabric of a culture unravels, the quality of a culture
deteriorates. Our purpose is to start right by showing how moral virtue is realistic,
practical and mutually beneficial for the quality of individual and family lives and
necessary for the benefits of freedom in a democracy to be realized.
I ask that we consider how to foster individual responsibility and what constitutes
humane treatment of each other. To do this, I must link theory and philosophy with
research and practice. I address theory and philosophy because the solutions we adopt in
seeking to build a humane, moral and stable society will be dictated by where we think
the problems originate. I address research because we need to monitor possibilities of
successful intervention. And I address practices because we learn from doing. When we
succeed in our educational efforts to foster virtuous living, our understanding of how that
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was possible is grounded in what theory or philosophy we use to make sense out of the
data we have collected. When we fail, the same process is relevant.
My thesis (revealing a philosophy regarding where to start in educating for moral
virtue) is that moral sensibility is central to being human, especially regarding how to
treat others. By focusing on a view of what it means to be human, we make it possible
and legitimate to address matters of moral virtue in the public domain.
The Relevance and Meaningfulness of Everyday Life
Before elaborating the what now and how is it done questions, please consider
this example of the need for, and the possible success or failure of, moral education
efforts reported by one of the teachers we had trained in character and citizenship
education in Albuquerque New Mexico.
Two weeks in to the delivery of a secondary school character education
curriculum, Bertha, the teacher, was ill for a day. The substitute teacher’s work with the
classes in the morning was uneventful. But the first class after lunch was memorable—for
all the wrong reasons. The substitute teacher had a rather bouffant hairstyle, and several
of the students who had lunched in the school cafeteria had been given small boxes of
raisins, which they had not eaten. Seeing the teacher’s hair as an inviting target, a few of
them, when the teacher’s back was turned as she wrote on the board, began throwing one
raisin at a time. The raisin-throwers earned 1 point for any raisin that hit the teacher, and
3 points if it stuck in her hair. The teacher had a bit of a 6th sense that something was
going on, but even when she suddenly turned around a few times, she was not quick
enough to see what was going on. Stifled student laughter tipped her off further that
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something was afoot, but it was not until her habit of running her hand through her hair
produced about nine points worth of raisins that she realized the truth. She berated the
students and stomped off to the principal’s office. He returned with her and scolded the
students further. The substitute went home. I do not know what the principal did about
the rest of the afternoon classes. The next day Bertha returned to school to find a note
stuffed in her box in the faculty lounge. It was from the principal, and began with,
“Bertha, yesterday your ETHICS students (he had written the word ethics in all caps and
underlined the word) . . .” –his note went on to report the recreant behavior of Bertha’s
students.
Bertha felt a hot flush of anger and as she crumpled the paper. She began plotting
how she would handle the situation with the class. She had already presented the material
on what it means to be human and on how to recognize the difference between humane
and inhumane behavior. That students—HER students—could have behaved as reported
was a slap in the face to her. She could not imagine they had violated their own
understanding. She threw the note in the garbage and headed to class. Vengeance would
be hers.
As the morning classes unfolded, however, Bertha reflected on whether she would
end up doing to the students verbally what they had done to the substitute teacher with
raisins. She knew there was a moral difference between self-righteously blaming others
and compassionately holding them accountable. After all, that was a way of
understanding such situations that the curriculum was cultivating.
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So she began to ask herself a different question regarding how to proceed with the
post-lunch class. She reported afterwards that she entered the class really not knowing
what she would do. She did ask herself the question, “Of all the things I could do when I
go in there, what do I believe is right to do?”
As she entered the room, the students fell silent. It was as if they knew this was
judgment day. Bertha nodded at the students, but said nothing. Then she asked, “Which
one of you is willing to tell me that how you treated the substitute yesterday was the right
thing to do?” Silence from the students. “Well, then,” she continued, “who is willing to
explain why what you did was wrong?” Finally a student said, almost inaudibly, “Ah, she
was boring.” Bertha: “Are you saying that raisin-throwing is O.K. if the teacher is
boring?” One of the students responded with a very seductive comment: “You’re not
boring.” Bertha did not comment on the manipulative flattery. She continued, “Can
anyone give me a reason raisin-throwing is a humane way to treat someone that is not just
an excuse for wrong-doing?” Finally one, then another, then a small chorus of students
admitted that what had been done was wrong. Bertha: “O.K. then, think on what we have
talked about regarding your own moral sensibility regarding how to treat others, and tell
me: Given what happened yesterday, what feelings of conscience as to what can or
should be done now are you experiencing?” Someone finally said, “We could invite the
teacher back and apologize to her.” Some students groaned at that idea—as appropriate as
the suggestion was. Several other options to make the wrong right were presented, but
finally the class generally agreed that they should write a letter of apology to the teacher.
Bertha seized on that option and said, “We have time right now. Let’s take a few minutes.
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I ask each of you to write a note of apology, which I will deliver to her.” Most of the
students pulled out sheets of paper and began writing. But two students sitting next to
each other just sat looking around without paper and without writing. Bertha, not wanting
to interrupt the other writing students, simply asked them a question with her eyes. One
of the two students blurted out, “Why do we have to write an apology—we didn’t throw
nothin’!” Bertha’s response? “And are you telling me that when the raisins were being
thrown that doing nothing was the right thing to do?” The two students pulled out sheets
of paper and began writing.
This example was just the beginning of Bertha’s success with that class in turning
theory into practice and in changing students’ ways of seeing themselves and others. It
was opening the door of understanding how matters of character and civility are
grounded in moral sensibility and in living true or false to one’s felt moral obligations,
especially regarding what it means to treat others humanely.
The Big Picture
So as to the theory and philosophy that guide the curriculum, we propose that a
cohesive and stable democracy may only be possible to the degree that individuals and
families honor their moral obligations towards each other. To engage one another
according to common moral and ethical grounds is basic to the quality of individual lives,
harmony in relationships, and cohesiveness in communities. Human enterprises fail when
trustworthiness, honesty and integrity are no longer hallmarks of interaction. Moral
education, formal and informal—in homes, public schools and corporations—is intended
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to reaffirm, maintain, and, where necessary, restore the ethical foundations that make
cultural life flourish and that foster individual well-being.
Many indicators suggest that moral education too often falls short of achieving its
most noble and essential purposes. This is partly to be expected since we can anticipate
recurring difficulties and destructive patterns of behavior in any human context that
entails human interaction. Of greater concern, however, is the very real potential for
failure if the beliefs and behaviors in a community or culture have drifted from ethical
foundations, thus weakening the infrastructure that otherwise could and should strengthen
moral education. That drift may suggest a cliché, but one that harbors an essential
understanding: “With great freedom comes great responsibility.” We may have moved
towards attending to the great freedom part while neglecting the great responsibility
component. If the drift has been too great, the moral tone and tenor of society may
instead operate to sabotage the very purposes for which moral education is undertaken,
not the least of which is to foster civility and enhance civic virtue. James Davison Hunter
(2000) states the problem succinctly:
As it is currently institutionalized, moral education does just the opposite of what
it intends. In its present forms, it undermines the capacity to form the convictions
upon which character must be based if it is to exist at all. . . . We want character
but without unyielding conviction; we want strong morality but without the
emotional burden of guilt or shame; we want virtue but without particular moral
justifications that invariably offend; we want good without having to name evil;
we want decency without the authority to insist upon it; we want moral
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community without any limitations to personal freedom. In short, we want what
we cannot possibly have on the terms that we want it. (p. xv)
If Hunter is right, any moral education enterprise must begin by working to repair
and restore the ethical grounds, both cultural and philosophical, that make any effort at
moral education, at any level of culture, realistic and worthwhile. Otherwise, moral
education efforts will remain, by and large, impotent.
The example from Bertha and the raisins comes from our work in moral education
that began decades ago. We were the beneficiaries of a series of federal grants that
allowed us to train selected teachers in 16 school districts spread across four western
states. These teachers volunteered to be trained in a character-citizenship curriculum and
then to invite their students to consider the meaning of being ethical in everyday life. The
first obstacle for us in obtaining permission to operate in school districts in California,
New Mexico, Utah and Arizona was the fact that, figuratively speaking, BYU was
tattooed on our foreheads. You can imagine the hesitancy of some administrators and
teachers to embrace the task of taking concepts to the public domain as sensitive as the
meaning of being ethical, moral, and persons of personal virtue, and even more so, to
allow us to be the messengers.
My colleague Chris Wallace and I had developed the curriculum before we
received the grant, and we anticipated we would not tread on either of two paths others
had typically taken. One path we planned to avoid was to begin by identifying some set
of universal values that everyone would supposedly agree on. We knew that path could
become blocked if even only one teacher or one student would claim that such and such a
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value was not what they believed in. After all, a belief that is deemed ethically legitimate
just because it is espoused short circuits how beliefs are to qualify as ethical in the first
place. It is not that we would avoid talking about specific qualities of virtue, but that
student understanding would have to be grounded in their lived experience, and not in as
yet un-discussed abstract concepts.
Another path we knew we had to avoid was the one where matters of right and
wrong were considered as merely culturally based, and thus could differ not only
individually, but also by cultural background. If we were to grant such an assumption, it
would be a way of deciding, in advance of discussions about moral virtue, that any
espoused personal belief must be considered as morally or ethically legitimate, just
because it had become normative behavior in any given society or sub-culture. We
wanted to show that the value of any value had to be evaluated by some criteria other
than by merely affirming them because they had become cultural norms. Will Rogers
once noted that “Common sense ain’t necessarily common practice,” and we feel the
same can be said about behaviors and attitudes that have become common practice in a
society, but ain’t necessarily ethical, moral or virtuous. Without any way to evaluate a
value or belief or commitment, the pursuit of almost any character, citizenship or virtue
education, as Hunter has implied, would be a waste of time. That is, without the ability to
discuss what makes a value valuable, educational efforts regarding character and
citizenship and civility—let alone classic understandings of moral virtue—would be
ethically hollow.
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I was startled to see this ethical relativism demonstrated in one of the sessions of a
conference on moral education. After a day-long seminar delivered by nationally known
professionals, the question and answer segment included this question from an audience
member: “I do not want to put words in your mouth, but aren’t several of you saying that
‘all moral values are neutral’?” Three of the five panelists agreed with the statement.
They had bought the notion that what is moral is determined by the norms of a culture,
and thus cannot be considered absolutes. Our invitation is to see such a philosophy, not as
moral neutrality, but as moral relativism, where the grounds for determining the moral
have been abandoned in favor of what a given culture or individual has decided, without
grounds, is defensible moral conduct. With such a starting point, it is not that such
education would be ethically neutral. It would install some form of ethical relativism as
an alternative to providing a foundation for how individuals are to get along, how
communities are to be connected, and how democracies can be cohesive.
Yet as we are often reminded, we live in a pluralistic society where there seems to
be no common ground for teaching virtue, citizenship or qualities of character. But
perhaps there is a way to move forward effectively in fostering virtue and improving
stable and caring societies. If we acknowledge the possibility that no culture is ethically
perfect, and almost no culture is ethically bankrupt, there is room for movement toward
restoring or enhancing the ethical. If the moral and ethical and virtuous can be defined
and distinguished, at least one additional path is open to educators in the goal of building
and maintaining a humane, moral and stable society. This path does not begin in concepts,
rules, principles or even reason. It begins in our hearts—in who we are. The quaint
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phrase, “You can’t give what you ain’t got” is perhaps truest when it refers to who we are
when delivering education for character and virtue.
Finding Solutions
Prior to defining virtue or evaluating values is a person’s view, implicit or explicit,
of what it means to be human, and of the reality of having a moral sensibility of how to
treat each other. When we see ourselves as capable of virtue or vice, of moral character or
immoral action, we sense those differences through our lived experience. We may only
have an implicit understanding of how we see ourselves and others, but those views are
fundamental to how we engage knowledge or develop skills. How we understand
knowledge or how we use skills spring from what we call our moral way of being in the
world. This way of being precedes how we benefit from knowledge and dictates the
purposes to which we apply our skills. Thus, we first focus on how we understand the
human condition. Our view of what it means to be human, however informal, informs
how we reason and how we feel about ourselves, others, and our situation. It can be said
then, that the heart of education for moral virtue begins in the quality of the human
condition we bring to our relationships and our circumstances. Specifically, we are saying
that the heart of change—towards or away from moral virtue—is a change of heart.
We chose this as a starting point for a third path in moral education, feeling that it
would avoid both common prescriptive declarations as well as morally relativistic ones. It
meant we made being a person of moral virtue central to the quality of human experience,
and a way of being in the world available, somehow, to almost anyone.
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We assumed that no matter what the content of any given curriculum, two
practical realities operate prior to the ideas and concepts to be shared. First, is the quality
of the student-teacher relationship, which we see as the major vehicle of influence or
success in programs designed to alter attitudes and behavior. Also, the quality of family
and friend relationships the students are connected to will either strengthen or undermine
the intended outcomes of the program. These relationship realities are evidences that
humans are relational beings, inescapably connected to and developed by, interaction
with others. This notion of being relational stands in contrast to a philosophy of
individualism, where the freedom of individuals to do as they wish is deemed inviolable.
Individualism that stands in contrast or in opposition to being relational unravels the
necessary social fabric that makes cohesive communities and individual development
possible. Private behavior does have public consequences, and to uncouple the two as if
they were not unavoidably linked is to shut down the progress in life for individuals,
families and communities.
Psychiatrist Robert Coles, who is famous for just about everything—including
being on the scene during six year old Ruby Bridges’ integration into a New Orleans
public school—illustrates this idea of humans-as-relational beings through an experience
he had during his second year of medical school. He and his fellow students felt weighed
down by the drudgery and pace of learning expected of them. But they convinced the
Dean of the medical school to invite an MD (William Carlos Williams) who also wrote
poetry, to speak to the entire medical school. Williams was a general practitioner serving
the immigrant poor in northern New Jersey. He thought he had no time to speak to those
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at a “big-shot medical school.” But at age 70 and not at full physical strength, he came
anyway and among the thoughts he offered the med students was this: “An important part
of [y]our lives w[ill] be spent ‘listening to people tell you their stories’; and in return,
‘they will want to hear your story of what their story means’” (p. ).
To Coles, this concern for patients was cold water to his thirsty soul, and he
sought permission from Williams to go with him some time on his rounds in the
tenements. He did so and recorded this gem from Dr. Williams:
I don’t know what I would do without those patients! Everyone thinks doctors are
good people because they help other people who are sick. But if you ask me, the
people who are sick are helping us all the time—if we’ll let them help us. How
many times I’ve gotten up and felt lousy; I’ve felt lousy driving over there, and
then I’ll knock on the door, and someone opens it, and it’s a mother or father, and
they want me to go right to their kid . . . .and you know what, the next thing with
me is that I’ve forgotten myself—isn’t that an achievement!—because I’m all tied
up with someone else. (Coles, 1989, 104).
Such an attitude reveals much about the character of Williams, but also of Coles, who
found the doctor’s openness and humility so meaningful.
The second reality, after the nature of relationships with others, is the quality of
each student’s moral way of being, beginning with how they see themselves and others,
and how they approach life itself. That is, are students willing to explore possible
revisions of their attitudes and decisions that would enhance the quality of the futures
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they hope for? This view of the moral, individual and relationship contexts informed how
we began the content of our curriculum:
1. The call to citizenship, moral character & personal virtue is an invitation. The
response to that invitation springs from a person’s living true or false to their
moral sensibility of how to treat others.
2. When doing education for character, citizenship or virtue, a person’s lived
experience must be the first measure of the value of the information—or the
ideas remain abstract and unconnected to a person’s daily life.
3. Our lived experience is an ideal, realistic, inescapable and fortunate ground
for addressing, in the public schools, issues of character, citizenship, civility
and virtue.
We measure the moral by experience first. All experience is relevant, whether it is in
ways we honor our membership on an athletic team, in our conduct in the school
hallways, in our responsiveness to or disdain for those in need, or in our determination
to be civil at all times and in all places.
Foundations
Our approach sought to dissolve the false wall of separation in the public culture
between the moral grounds for individual character, citizenship and civility and the way
we behave in the democratic communities of which we are a part. So how, in practice,
were we to implement moral education based on understanding what it means to be
human? We embarked on practices that were grounded in where we thought lack of
virtue and incivility originated: In the human condition. Our first task was to see if
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everyday secondary school students and their committed teachers would resonate with
our focus. Here is how we began.
Consider these two questions (which we originally used in training selected
teachers in the school districts, and used to introduce secondary students to the
curriculum): Have you ever been in a situation where you felt or sensed something was
right to do? Everyone says yes to that question. But having gotten simple consensus on
that idea, we asked for concrete examples. We could not afford to leave the idea of
experiencing felt moral obligations to be vague and abstract. Once we had five or six
examples from the students themselves, we paused to give time for additional comments
and questions.
One student in a class we visited gave this example in response to the question:
“My mom is raising me alone, and we have a deal where one night she does the dishes,
and the next night I do them. One night when it was her turn to do the dishes, I looked
away from the TV to the kitchen and noticed how tired she looked. I had this sense come
to me that, her turn or not, I just ought to go in there and do the dishes. Is that what you
mean by having a sense of something that is right to do?”
We used the remainder of the class period obtaining additional examples of
specific incidents and affirmed that felt moral obligations such as these are common to
human experience. The next class period, we asked the second question: Have you ever
been in a situation where you felt or sensed something was right to do, but you
simultaneously refused to do it? Everyone says yes to that question. In fact, although
results varied across classrooms and school districts, we were amused that of the
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incidents that were given as examples for question 1, about 60% of them turned out to be
illustrations also of question 2. In the case of the student who felt a moral sense do the
dishes for his mother, reported, in answer to question 2, “I didn’t do it.” He noted that
notwithstanding his feeling to help her, he turned back to the sports report on TV.
After getting additional examples in answer to Question 2, especially from those
who hadn’t provided examples to Question 1, we were able to explore the following
issues:
1. Reflect on when you felt or sensed to act on something you believed was right
to do, but you didn’t. Can you describe your thoughts and feelings before you
refused to do the thing you believed was right to do? The answers were simple
ones of having not taken much thought about the matter, but just going and
doing.
2. What did you say to yourself after you went against your conscience?
Typical answers systematically illustrated a certain quality of thoughts and
emotions that were distinct from, and more extensive than, the comments made when
they were being true to conscience. Those refusing to do what they believed reported
their emotions were resentful, hostile, and included complaining about others (the nondish-washing student said that if he disrupted the sequence this once, his mother would
think he ought to do it every night, and the process would no longer be fair). Often their
resentments or guilt included getting down on themselves. Their thoughts became selfjustifying rationalizations of wrong-doing and flat out excuse making that, while they
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were still going against conscience, seemed, at the time, like legitimate reasons for not
following through.
Student responses made it easy for us to show how, in matters of conscience, we
live in one of two possible worlds of experience. When acting according to conscience,
both emotions and thoughts seemed to be of the same quality. Emotions typically
included compassion, concern for others, willingness to forgive, patience, and so on. The
quality of thoughts was reflective, rational, inquisitive, affirmative of others’ ideas, and
so on. By contrast, people who reported resisting or going against conscience reported
emotions of resentment, jealousy, impatience, hostility and bitterness. Resistant thoughts
included accusing and blaming, being defensive, offering reasons to justify their behavior
and even included thoughts that buttressed their co-existing feelings of superiority while
yet insisting they were victims of others or of their own imperfections. It was also clear
that the observations about their thoughts and emotions when they were going against
conscience were not recognized until after they had given up their resistance. Here is an
example from a senior in high school:
I had finally made the football team my senior year after having been cut the
previous two years before the season began. But near the end of the last day of
practice before the season began, the coach was demeaning of me in a way I felt I
simply could not take any more. I resolved to abandon that which I had fought so
hard to obtain. I was going to quit the team. My dad heard my decision and said,
“If you are quitting because you believe it is right, I will support you. But you
worked hard these past years and never gave up. If you are quitting in order to
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punish the coach and get revenge, you face a year where you will either not go to
the games at all and be miserable, or you will go to the games and be miserable if
they succeed without you. You will want them to fail and will feel empty after
any game, no matter whether they win or lose.” I didn’t want to admit that my dad
had described exactly what I had been unwilling to see. I decided to stick with the
team—that was the real right thing to do. (AANCHOR Archives, unpublished).
Sometimes in class discussions students who were carrying attitudes of
resentment would deny their feelings had anything to do with going against a moral
feeling. They would be insistent that their feelings were justified and that they were not
making excuses. We needed to caution our teachers that when students were insistent in
this way, we could not afford to diagnose, interpret or label them as resistant to a moral
feeling. In spite of those students exhibiting what might be considered classic examples
of moral resistance, we as observers often do not know the hearts of those who treat
others abrasively or find life to be a burden. We can distinguish between the two worlds
of experience as to their relational quality, but it is unwise and inappropriate to use
someone’s symptoms as evidence of a moral feeling they have not acknowledged. We
can offer the possibility of being resistant to conscience, and yet leave open the door to
their ongoing self-examination and considering of possibilities.
Human Nature and Moral Being
The two worlds of experience are of distinctly different qualities, but as C. Terry
Warner (2002) has pointed out, the meaning of behavior is deeper than the behavior itself.
Besides, if a person’s bitter anger, for example, is really a symptom of their resistance to
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a felt moral sense of how to act, then they are blind to the source of their feelings anyway.
To them, feelings and attitudes that might look to others like excuses, are genuine,
justifiable reasons for their feelings and actions. They are not pretending to be bitter or
jealous or resentful—the feelings are real to them. If such feelings were the consequence
of moral resistance, only after giving up those feelings would they consider the
possibility that their refusal to live true to their own moral sense had anything to do with
their attitudes or behavior.
In responding to students who are in the midst of such defensiveness, teachers, by
not imposing the idea that all such symptoms are signs of betrayal of conscience, leave
the door open to consider other possibilities. Often in such class situations, the teacher
would acknowledge that ultimately the individual must figure out for themselves the
roots of their thoughts and feelings. More than once, a teacher who faced a student who
rejected the idea that their bitterness was linked to moral resistance, came later to the
teacher and said, “you know, I see it now, but I wouldn’t see it then.”
To understand this phenomenon more directly, consider a time when you felt
defensive or hostile or aggressively angry about someone or some situation. Then at some
later point, those feelings dissolved and you felt forgiving or sorrowful over how you had
acted. Simon Wiesenthal, the life-long hunter of Nazi war criminals, published a book
near the end of his life titled, Justice, not vengeance. (1989, Grove Wiedenfeld, New
York). It was, in part, a response to critics who suggested that what had happened was a
long time ago and why did finding the perpetrators still matter? Whatever malice
Wiesenthal might have harbored across perhaps years, had disappeared as he continued
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the search for justice. And it was the search for justice Wiesenthal believed the holocaust
victims and their descendants deserved.
If our negative feelings towards ourselves and others really are an expression of
resisting our own sense of being virtuous, then they really are the price we pay for going
against conscience. One of the key concepts in our curriculum, especially relevant when
we are talking about how to be free of moral or ethical resistance, is the definition of selfdeception offered by C. Terry Warner (2002) , with whom we had had a decades long
association, and whose philosophical work informed our curriculum He describes an
alternative way of how to see the truth about ourselves, which our betrayal of our own
ethical sense blinds us to, and offers hope that our most troubled feelings, attitudes and
thoughts can be given up. Unpacking that idea for secondary students is simple, but not
necessarily easy, and is a bigger task than this chapter can undertake. It is, however a way
of understanding human experience that offers genuine hope for change, rather than
settling for just being able to cope with the injustices, discrimination, disappointments
and tragedies of mortal life.
But regarding when we experience strong emotions and thoughts, consider that
they can be of two different qualities. There really is something akin to “righteous
indignation”—although I am not convinced someone experiencing it has ever labeled it
so. Such emotion attends those who seek justice, or who engage in preserving those who
have been mistreated and abused. But there is also a self-betraying bitter anger, often felt
helplessly, that is more likely to be a symptom of moral resistance, where we become like
the people we resent by resenting them.

The two types of anger do not inhabit the
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same world of experience at the same time. But our point today, and important for any
moral education curriculum, is to note that to build cohesive communities and foster
democracy requires us to be compassionate, willing to search for solutions to problems
and even to mourn for those who are demeaned, rejected or dismissed as to their value.
The alternative to that way of approaching societal ills and injustices is to be bitter, to
answer injustice with injustice with an insistence that we are either justified or excused in
such behavior. That second approach will undermine the very principles and practices we
claim to be defending.
Responses, Responsiveness and Resistance
Is virtuous behavior, where people live true to their moral sense realistic or
possible? Surely we have all experienced extensive periods on our lives when, precisely
because we have been true to our moral sense of how to treat others, that we have not
succumbed to betraying conscience. My oldest son, eventually an all-state high school
soccer player, while in elementary school, came upon a group of boys ridiculing a new
boy in the school that my son had already befriended. The boy had some leg deformity
that required him to limp, and that defect was the substance of the ridicule being thrown
at him. Most of those doing the bullying happened to be members of my son’s soccer
team. Without hesitation, my son went up to the boy being targeted, put his arm around
him and said, “Hi, Charles”—how are you doing? Hey guys, have you met my friend
Charles?” That ended the confrontation. My son could have behaved differently. If he
had, it would have been evidence of his moral resistance. Resistant options would have
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included joining in the ridicule, or resentfully and condescendingly chewing out the
members of his soccer team.
We were often reminded that it is very seductive to see the past as something that
is constantly (and perhaps even inevitably) acting upon us so that in the present moment
we really cannot see moral meaning or act according to conscience. It is possible to see
that our moral way of being in the present moment defines how we see the past. This
alternative way of seeing and being opens possibilities for change that may not seem
likely, but are possibilities nonetheless. A teacher reminded us of how the quality of the
past need not dictate the quality of the future, or the compassionate sensibility of
someone in less-than-ideal circumstances:
I had assigned students to go home and find out from their parents (or the
person(s) responsible for raising them) what the circumstances of their own birth
had been. They were to report the next class period—not anything that was
private or inappropriate to disclose—regarding what they learned about their own
beginning and what the family situation was. One girl in the class, Jenny, was
really silent as she left, and it dawned on me that I may have set in motion a bad
situation for her. The common gossip in the teacher’s lounge was that this girl’s
mother was a prostitute. I wondered what the girl’s home life was and began
worrying about whether the assignment would be an invitation for the girl to stir
up a past full of sensitivities best left alone. The next day the discussion went
quite well, and we were able to make several points on how we can use the past to
chart a course for the future. But I was not enjoying the dialogue as much as the
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students seemed to be, because the girl I had worried about was silent as always,
but to me, in my nervousness, silent in a more intense way. The bell rang, and as
the students filed out, I saw that Jenny was lingering, Once the room was empty,
she came up to me and said, “Mrs. Johnson, thanks for giving me that assignment.
My mom has been sick lately, and my older brothers have hit the road and don’t
come home no more. My mom’s boyfriends don’t come ’round no more and my
brothers tell me to get out of there. But you know what, I won’t leave, because my
mother needs me. I also found out, through your assignment, that I have an older
sister that I never knew I had. Mom and I talked about it. She doesn’t want the life
for me that she has had, and neither do I, but I am going to help take care of her
and still do the best I can in school.
Another example of a person retaining, in the present moment, a way of being that
does not make them a victim of the past, is the well-chronicled story of Ruby Bridges,
who was escorted daily by highway patrol troopers to her New Orleans school past
screaming mobs, was asked one night by Robert Coles what she thought of the threats
and obscenities being thrown at her. Her response was, “Oh Mr. Coles, they got it bad.
I’ve got to pray for their souls.” Coles later said that he just knew that Ruby was in denial
and that the day would come when the effects of this trauma would surface and Ruby
would have some kind of breakdown. He kept track of her for decades and once declared
to me in a phone conversation that he was now convinced that she would never have a
breakdown—that she was of the same spirit as an adult as she had been as a six year old
walking past the mob.
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In example after example, we saw the possibility that it is not the circumstances
we pass through that necessarily dictate what or who we become, but who we are when
we pass through those circumstances. Of course, we also saw examples where individuals
were convinced that they had no say, no role in creating what their tomorrows might
bring, and were insistent that their lot in life could not and never would change.
Admittedly, we sought to pull the rug out from under that point of view. Our purpose was
not to replace it with an unrealistic view that life is always easy or automatically
wonderful. Rather, we demonstrated that once we insist that we cannot do anything in a
given situation, the idea of hope is a naïve concept from a world of fantasy. That view is
frequently embedded in our being false to conscience. We may find ourselves in
disheartening circumstances because we don’t know what we need to know or because
we do not have the skills that would help, but if we retain our willingness to give our best
to what we believe is right, we will still have a starting point in an honest search for
solutions to the problems at hand. It is this phenomenon that allows us to propose that our
willingness to act in accordance with conscience is more fundamental than our
knowledge or skill, and that expresses moral courage.
Moral Dilemmas
Although moral dilemmas that call forth being morally courageous are not foreign
to human experience, using artificial dilemmas that create ethical “traps”—perhaps
insolvable ones at that—may not nudge students forward in moral understanding or moral
action as much as has been thought. If, in education for moral virtue, we offer contrived
moral dilemmas and simultaneously restrict the boundaries for moral solutions, we run
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the risk of squashing a student’s confidence in their moral intuitions and suggesting that
there are just no answers to some dilemmas.
It may be that some dilemmas in real life will not be solved, but that fact is not
just because there are times when the situation itself makes a solution impossible. More
frequently, it is due to the moral agents in a situation being untrue to conscience, and thus
creating the moral dilemmas they are supposedly, but self-deceivingly, trying to solve. If
dilemmas are to be used as a teaching tool at all, those from someone’s lived experience
are better springboards for ethical discussion and debate than are contrived dilemmas that
are also linked to rules of engagement that restrict the full range of options that a person
being virtuous might propose.
We do not have hard data on how often moral dilemmas are still used in the
public schools for the hoped-for purpose of enhancing moral reasoning, but if they are to
be used at all, the starting point for solutions might include honoring the notion that
students, in their humanity, bring a moral sensibility to dilemmas that are fundamental to
the solutions they may propose. We were the guest speakers in one classroom and had
answered a question about moral dilemmas. We used the now classic (or perhaps
clichéd) case of the people in the sunken ship’s lifeboat dilemma to show why we felt the
use of such dilemmas was problematic. The assignment given is to decide which three of
the eight people in the boat should be thrown out so the other five may live. Students
must give their reasons for throwing out the aging golf pro with tuberculosis, instead of
the left-handed rock star, etc. We pointed out that such dilemmas, if used at all, should
allow a completely open range of solutions. Those can then be examined and discussed as
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to their moral validity. We also noted that while the future in such a situation looks grim,
most people do not have a crystal ball handy to know absolutely what tomorrow may
bring. Resorting to people-throwing implies we unfailingly know the future.
After class ended, a high school sophomore came up to us and said that she had
been given that assignment in a class the previous semester, and had told the teacher that
she felt it right not to throw anyone out of the boat. The teacher explained it was part of
the exercise and she would have to do it and give her reasons. She complied, but after
writing whatever she figured out to write to justify throwing people into the ocean, she
wrote something close to, “If I were really in this situation, I would not throw anyone out
of the boat. To me, the moral question here is not whether I live or whether I die, but how
I live and how I die.” Such wisdom from this student was at least as valid a moral reason
as all the other reasons offered to justify the taking of innocent lives.
A common consequence of curricula designed as an invitation to be true to
conscience was that students generally saw the meaningfulness of the starting point in
contexts unique to them. Their own experience became the measure of understanding
how to solve problems, meet challenges, or even meet discrimination and disadvantage.
Any case or example where moral solutions are to be contrasted with the virtuous
alternatives can hardly be helpful if virtuous alternatives such as refusing to throw people
in the ocean are ruled out in advance. And if students deceive themselves about what
options a person being morally virtuous in any situation could consider, their solutions
will be self-deceived as well. Any curriculum is only as good as the moral responsiveness
it invites and allows in students.
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Possibilities
Each student sees the meaning of the curriculum in their own story and either
relates it to how to be true to conscience, or finds a new level of avoiding how they could
do more to foster a quality future, no matter what their past disadvantages might have
been or are in the present moment. The curriculum is just an invitation and a starting
point. The moral warmth and virtue of teachers and coaches and friends either fans that
flame of future possibilities or, however unintentionally, starve students of their hopes
and dreams. Any curriculum for moral virtue can align common sense with common
practice if the educators themselves are true to conscience in the ways they are inviting
the students to see and be.
One example of how our curriculum came to focus on the future was an
assignment that invited students to align their present behavior with their hopes and
dreams. In line with having their own experience be the first measure of what is realistic,
we had teachers conduct what we came to call the “Trilogy assignment” simply because
it consisted in three assignments across three class periods and included assigned
interaction with available parents.
1. What if you were born tomorrow? What would you want the circumstances to
be? Students were asked to write answers down and they were discussed in
class. Aside from about 15% of the answers being joking or mischievous (I
would want a split-level swimming pool, rich parents, super-powers), students
generally focused on the compassionate-relational dimension in the family.
They wanted nurturing, caring, protective parents, and a stable home
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environment. We then asked them to go home and find out the circumstances
of their own birth (as in the example from Jenny described earlier).
2. If you were to become a mother or a father tomorrow, what would you want the
circumstances to be? At this point students became very practical—in a
temporal sense. They wanted housing, food, clothing, financial means, and a
spouse they could trust. We didn’t realize it at the time, but the way we asked
the questions may have skewed the answers a bit. That is, the first question
almost invited a self-centered, all-about-me approach. This second question is
inherently relational, and students generally rose to the occasion of pondering
what it would mean to have the well-being of an infant as their responsibility.
3. How will you have to live—what decisions do you need to make—between
now and when you really do become a mother or father, in order to help make
possible the things you indicated you needed in question 2? Students began to
plot educational and financial goals, and even how they would want not to
have to face parenthood alone.
Takeaways
Besides avoiding the traps of prescribing behavior or deferring to moral relativism,
what are the advantages of using a focus on the human condition as the springboard for
education in moral virtue? Given that character and citizenship are foundations for the
success of democracies, how can a mere curriculum make a difference? Alone, it cannot.
While cultural norms are not always in support of the foundations of moral virtue, culture
does matter in fostering or encouraging practices. U.S. culture prohibits some destructive
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behaviors, some through enforcement of law, but mostly through encouraging behavior
and attitudes that constitute being obedient to conscience and to the unenforceable.
Cultures also permit some behavior that is deemed less than ideal (and thus to be
tolerated), but the human cost of that permissiveness is no less real. Finally, cultures
promote some behaviors that are deemed to be for the good society at large. Character
and citizenship education can pre-empt or exist parallel to the criteria that define
categories of prohibition, permission and promotion of behavior. Seeing humans as
relational, and capable of acting in each others’ best interests, rather than trying to find
compromises that seek to align or harmonize each individual’s distinct self-interests, does
not take into account whether a self-interest is beneficial or destructive to one’s self or to
others. It helps, for example, if the schools in which character and citizenship education
are offered, make citizenship a pre-requisite to representing the school to the public.
Whether it be on the debate team, in the choir or on the football team, citizenship and
civility are hallmarks of living a quality life and of building community. The boundaries
between prohibiting, permitting and promoting may slide along a continuum, but the first
question for school personnel is to ask, “when we examine what we believe is right about
how to treat others, how do we conduct ourselves in and out of the classroom, in the
hallways, on the streets, on the athletic fields, in our homes and on the job?” An
individual’s willingness to consider such issues is the pre-requisite to solving relational
problems that are produced by betrayal of moral virtues we already accept in our hearts.
Unwillingness to address matters of conscience and of the moral virtue of how we treat
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others creates a dead end for efforts to enhance the freedoms and responsibilities
democratic societies are uniquely organized to make possible.
So what are we to make of a foundation for moral education that begins by
addressing what it means to be human—and then establishes, through students’ and
teachers’ own lived experience, that we all have experienced times when we have felt a
moral sensibility to take a certain action, and have either lived true or false to that sense?
How do these kinds of moral education efforts operate and what is teachers’ experience
with it?
Our research results varied slightly by state, but overall students with this
curriculum, in contrast to the control groups, reported more feelings of loyalty to family,
and more conservative attitudes regarding early sexual involvement, and more
discussions with parents about values and beliefs. Teachers understood that the relevant
foundations of the curriculum delivery included the following:
1. The human condition is related to the successes and failures of almost any
attempt to educate for virtue and purpose. Democracies flourish when
individuals live lives of moral virtue.
2. An approach to virtue and how to act in each other’s best interests can be the
foundation of any approach to citizenship and moral education.
3. Moral relativism can be replaced with practical moral foundations regarding
humans having a moral sensibility to which they can be true or false. This can
be done without dictating or prescribing behavior.
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4. Replacing individualism (pitting the Self against the Group) with being
relational shows how moral virtue regarding how we treat others includes the
benefits of honoring both obligations and commitments. This includes showing
how others matter and how our treatment of them is an inescapable feature of
living lives of high quality—and that especially are made possible in a free
democracy. These qualities are at risk if we go against conscience both in
public and in so-called private life.
5. The best laboratory for learning about human experience is everyday life.
Situations both simple and extreme can be met more effectively when practical
moral foundations and moral commitments regarding how to treat others are
honored.
6. No curriculum or idea offers a guarantee that student attitudes and behavior
will change or be permanent. This is because individuals retain their ability to
live true or false to conscience in any given moment. Yet, there is a starting
point that can invite youth to make choices that enhance the understanding of
virtue and purposes in life, and identify the possibilities of how they can help
create for themselves a quality future.
7. How we see ourselves and others is a function of whether we are living lives of
moral virtue—as teachers or students. It is a sign of how we are or are not
strengthening the cohesiveness of democratic societies. Teachers are not only
not exempt from being examples of what they teach, but will undermine their
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best efforts to foster virtuous living if they are not on the path of being true to
conscience.
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